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NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
EQUILIBRIUM OF THE HOTELLING MODEL
SATOSHI HAYASHI† AND NAOKI TSUGE‡
Abstract. We study a model of vendors competing to sell a homogeneous
product to customers spread evenly along a linear city. This model is based
on Hotelling’s celebrated paper in 1929. Our aim in this paper is to present
a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium. This yields a repre-
sentation for the equilibrium. To achieve this, we first formulate the model
mathematically. Next, we prove that the condition holds if and only if vendors
are equilibrium.
1. Introduction
We study a model in which a linear city of length 1 on a line and customers are
uniformly distributed with density 1 along this interval. We consider n vendors
moving on this line. Let the location of the vendor k (k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) be
xk ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn and denote the location of n
vendors (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) by x. Since we study the competition between vendors,
we consider n ≥ 2 in particular. The price of one unit of product for each vendor
is identical. Moreover, we assume the following.
If there exist l (l = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) vendors nearest to a customer, the customer
purchases 1/l unit of product per unit of time from each of the l vendors respectively.
Every vendor then seeks a location to maximize his profit.
We then represent the profit of vendor k per unit of time by a mathematical
notation. Given a vector ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn) ∈ [0, 1]
n and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, we define a set
S(ξ, y) = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} : |ξj − y| = min
i
|ξi − y|}. By using a density function
ρk(ξ, y) =


0 if |ξk − y| > min
i
|ξi − y|
1
|S(ξ, y)|
if |ξk − y| = min
i
|ξi − y|
,
we define
fk(ξ) =
∫ 1
0
ρk(ξ, y)dy, (1.1)
where |A| represents a number of elements in a set A. We call fk(x) the profit of
vendor k per unit of time for a location x. We then define equilibrium as follows.
Key words and phrases. The Hotelling model, equilibrium, Mathematical formulation.
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Definition 1.1. A location x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ [0, 1]
n is called equilibrium,
if
fk(x
∗) ≥ fk(x
∗
1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3, . . . , x
∗
k−1, xk, x
∗
k+1, . . . , x
∗
n) (1.2)
holds for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} and xk ∈ [0, 1].
We review the known results. The present model is based on Hotelling’s model
in [4]. Although we consider homogeneous vendors, Hotelling did heterogeneous
vendors. In [1, Chaper 10], Alonso, W. treated with the same model as our prob-
lem for two vendors. He introduced this model as the competition between two
vendors of ice cream along a beach. In [3], the model for n vendors was studied.
Furthermore, Eaton, B. C. and Lipsey, R. G. investigated a necessary and sufficient
condition for equilibrium. More precisely, they claimed that (1.i) and (1.ii) in [3,
p29] if and only if n vendors are equilibrium (see also [p9][2]). Although this is an
interesting approach from the point of mathematical view, unfortunately, it seems
that (1.i) and (1.ii) are not sufficient conditions. In fact, we consider a location
x =
(
1
10
,
1
10
,
3
10
,
3
10
,
7
10
,
7
10
,
9
10
,
9
10
)
.
Then, we find that f1(x) = f2(x) = f7(x) = f8(x) = 1/10, f3(x) = f4(x) =
f5(x) = f6(x) = 3/20. Therefore, this example satisfies (1.i) and (1.ii).
Remark 1.1. In [3], vendors in our problem are called firms and fk(x) seems to
be called a market of firm k. In addition, we regard two pairs of peripheral firms
in (1.ii) of [3] as firms 1, 2 and 9, 10.
On the other hand, if x3 moves from 3/10 to 1/2, x3 can obtain a profit 2/10
more than the original one 3/20. In addition, the definition of their terminologies
seems not to be clear, such as market, peripheral, equilibrium, etc. Therefore, our
goal in this paper is to formulate this model mathematically and present a revised
necessary and sufficient for equilibrium.
For convenience, we set x0 = 0, xn+1 = 1 and denote a interval [xk, xk+1] by
Ik (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n). Then our main theorem is as follows.
Theorem 1.1.
(i) n = 2
x =
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
is a unique equilibrium. (1.3)
(ii) n = 3
There exits no equilibrium. (1.4)
(iii) n ≥ 4
x is equilibrium, if and only if the following conditions (1.5) and (1.6)
hold.
|I0| = |In| > 0 (n ≥ 2), |I1| = |In−1| = 0 (n ≥ 4),
|I0| : |I2| = 1 : 2, |In−2| : |In| = 2 : 1 (n ≥ 4),
(1.5)
|Ij | ≤ 2|I0| (0 ≤ j ≤ n), 2|I0| ≤ |Ik|+ |Ik+1| (1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2). (1.6)
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2. Preliminary
In this section, we prepare some lemmas and a proposition to prove our main
theorem in a next section. We first consider the profit of i vendors which locate at
one point. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. We consider a location x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) with x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3 ≤
· · · ≤ xn. We assume that xl < xl+1 = · · · = xk = · · · = xl+i < xl+i+1 (n ≥
2, l ≥ 0, l + i+ 1 ≤ n+ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
(i) If xl 6= x0 and xl+i+1 6= xn+1, fk(x) =
1
2i
(|Il|+ |Il+i|).
(ii) If xl = x0 and xl+i+1 6= xn+1, fk(x) =
1
i
(
|Il|+
1
2
|Il+i|
)
.
(iii) If xl 6= x0 and xl+i+1 = xn+1, fk(x) =
1
i
(
1
2
|Il|+ |Il+i|
)
.
(iv) If xl = x0 and xl+i+1 = xn+1, fk(x) =
1
n
.
Proof.
Proof of (i)
We have fk(x) =
1
i
(
1
2
|Il|+
1
2
|Il+i|
)
=
1
2i
(|Il|+ |Il+i|).
Proof of (ii)
We have fk(x) =
1
i
(
|Il|+
1
2
|Il+i|
)
=
1
i
(
|Il|+
1
2
|Il+i|
)
.
Proof of (iii)
We have fk(x) =
1
i
(
1
2
|Il|+ |Il+i|
)
=
1
i
(
1
2
|Il|+ |Il+i|
)
.
Proof of (iv)
We have fk(x) =
1
n
(|I0|+ |In|) =
1
n
.

Next, the following proposition play an important role.
Proposition 2.2. If the location of n vendors x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) with x1 ≤
x2 ≤ x3 ≤ · · · ≤ xn (n ≥ 2) is equilibrium, the following holds.
x1 6= 0 and xn 6= 1. (2.1)
No more than 2 vendors can occupy a location. (2.2)
x1 = x2 and xn−1 = xn. (2.3)
Proof.
Proof of (2.1)
If x1 = 0, we show that x is not equilibrium.
(i) x1 = 0 and x2 6= 0 We notice that f1(x) =
1
2
|I1|. Setting x
′
1 =
1
2
|I1|, we
then have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) = |[0, x
′
1]|+
1
2
|[x′1, x2]| > |[0, x
′
1]| >
1
2
|I1| = f1(x),
where |I| represents the length of a interval I.
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(ii) x1 = · · · = xi = 0 and xi+1 6= 0 (2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
We notice that f1(x) =
1
2i
|Ii|. Setting x
′
1 ∈ (0, xi+1), we have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) =
1
2
(|[0, x′1]|+ |[x
′
1, xi+1]|) =
1
2
|[0, xi+1]| =
1
2
|Ii| >
1
2i
|Ii| = f1(x).
(iii) x1 = · · · = xn = 0 (n ≥ 2)
We notice that f1(x) =
1
n
. Setting x′1 =
1
2
, we have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) =
1
2
∣∣∣∣
[
0,
1
2
]∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣
[
1
2
, 1
]∣∣∣∣ = 14 +
1
2
>
1
2
≥
1
n
= f1(x).
From (i)–(iii), if x1 = 0, we have proved that x is not equilibrium. Furthermore,
from the symmetry, if xn = 1, we can similarly prove that x is not equilibrium.
Proof of (2.2)
We prove that x is not equilibrium, provided that i (3 ≤ i ≤ n) vendors occupy
at a point. We assume that xl < xl+1 = · · · = xk = · · · = xl+i < xl+i+1 (l ≥
0, l + i + 1 ≤ n + 1, 3 ≤ i ≤ n). Here we recall that we set x0 = 0 and
xn+1 = 1. Therefore there exist xl and xl+i+1 at least one respectively. We notice
that xl < xk < xl+i+1 and there exists no vendor on (xl, xk) and (xk, xl+i+1).
Dividing this proof into four cases, we prove (2.2).
(i) xl 6= x0 and xl+i+1 6= xn+1 In this case, if |Il| ≥ |Il+i|, we notice that
fk(x) =
1
2i
(|Il| + |Il+i|) ≤
1
6
(|Il|+ |Il+i|) =
1
6
(|Il|+ |Il|) =
1
3
|Il|. Setting
x′k ∈ (xl, xl+1), we have fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) =
1
2
(|[xl, x
′
k]|+
|[x′k, xk]|) =
1
2
|Il| > fk(x).
For the other case |Il| < |Il+i|, from the symmetry, we can similarly
show that there exists x′k such that fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) >
fk(x). Thus, if xl 6= x0 and xl+i+1 6= xn+1, we can prove that x is not
equilibrium.
(ii) xl = x0 and xl+i+1 6= xn+1
In this case, if |Il| ≥ |Il+i|, we find that fk(x) =
1
i
(|Il| +
1
2
|Il+i|) ≤
1
3
(|Il|+
1
2
|Il+i|) ≤
1
3
(|Il|+
1
2
|Il|) =
1
2
|Il|. Setting x
′
k =
2
3
|Il|, we have
fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) = |[0, x
′
k]|+
1
2
|[x′k, xk]| > |[0, x
′
k]|
=
2
3
|Il| ≥ fk(x).
For the other case |Il| < |Il+i|, from the symmetry, we can similarly show
that there exists x′k such that fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) > fk(x).
Thus, if xl = x0 and xl+i+1 6= xn+1, we have showed that x is not equi-
librium.
(iii) xl 6= x0 and xl+i+1 = xn+1
From the symmetry of (ii), there exists x′k satisfying
fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) > fk(x). Thus if xl 6= x0 and xl+i+1 =
xn+1, we have showed that x is not equilibrium.
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(iv) xl = x0 and xl+i+1 = xn+1
In this case, we find fk(x) =
1
n
. If xk ≥
1
2
, for x′k =
2
5
, we have
fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) = |[0, x
′
k]|+
1
2
|[x′k, xk]| > |[0, x
′
k]|
=
2
5
≥
1
n
= fk(x).
For the other case xk <
1
2
, from the symmetry, we can similarly show
that there exists x′k such that fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) > fk(x).
Thus, if xl = x0 and xl+i+1 = xn+1, we have showed that x is not equi-
librium.
From (i)–(iv), we can complete the proof of (2.2).
Proof of (2.3)
If x1 < x2, we show that x is not equilibrium. (x1 6= 0)
We notice that f1(x) = |I0|+
1
2
|I1|. Setting x
′
1 = |I0|+
1
2
|I1|, we have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) = |[0, x
′
1]|+
1
2
|[x′1, x2]| > |[0, x
′
1]| = |I0|+
1
2
|I1| = f1(x). Thus x
is not equilibrium. If xn−1 < xn, we can similarly prove that x is not equilibrium
(xn 6= 1). 
Finally, we compare a location after the movement of a vendor with the original
one. To do this, we introduce the following notation.
For a given location of n vendors x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) with x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤
xn, we move vendor k from xk to a point in A ⊂ [0, 1]. We denote the resultant
location by xk → A. We notice that xk → A represents the following vector
(x1, x2, , . . . , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, . . . , xn), (2.4)
where x′k is a location of vendor k after movement and x
′
k ∈ A.
Then we have the following lemmas. Since their proofs are a little complicated,
they are postponed to Appendix.
Lemma 2.3. If a location of n vendors x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) satisfies (1.5) and
(1.6), |I0| ≤ fk(x) (1 ≤ k ≤ n).
Lemma 2.4. If a location of n vendors x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) satisfies (1.5) and
(1.6), fk(xk → [0, 1]) ≤ fk(x) (1 ≤ k ≤ n).
3. Proof of Theorem 1.1
We are now position to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (i)
We prove that if x = (x1, x2) =
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
, x is equilibrium.
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Proof. (i) We consider vendor 1. We then notice that f1(x) =
1
2
. For any
x′1 ∈
[
0,
1
2
)
, we have
f1(x
′
1, x2) = |[0, x
′
1]|+
1
2
|[x′1, x2]| < |[0, x
′
1]|+ |[x
′
1, x2]| = |[0, x2]| =
1
2
= f1(x).
For any x′1 ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
, from the symmetry of (a), we can similarly prove
that f1(x
′
1, x2) < f1(x). Therefore, for any x
′
1 ∈ [0, 1], we have f1(x) ≥
f1(x
′
1, x2).
(ii) Next, we consider vendor 2. For any x′2 ∈ [0, 1], we find that f2(x) ≥
f2(x1, x
′
2) in a similar manner to (i).
From (i) and (ii), we have showed that
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
is equilibrium. 
Next, we show that x =
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
is a necessary condition for equilibrium. There-
fore, we prove that if x 6=
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
, then x is not equilibrium.
Proof. From (2.1), when x1 = 0 or x2 = 1, x is not equilibrium. Therefore, we
treat with the case where x1 6= 0 or x2 6= 1.
(i) x1 6= x2
From (2.3), x is not equilibrium in this case.
(ii) x1 = x2
We first notice that f1(x) =
1
2
in this case. If x1 >
1
2
, setting x′1 =
1
2
,
we obtain
f1(x
′
1, x2) = |[0, x
′
1]|+
1
2
|[x′1, x2]| > |[0, x
′
1]| =
1
2
= f1(x).
If x1 <
1
2
, from symmetry, we can show that there exits x′1 ∈ [0, 1] such
that f1(x
′
1, x2) > f1(x).
From the above, we have proved that
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
is a necessary condition for equilib-
rium. 
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (ii)
If n = 3, (2.2) contradicts (2.3). Therefore, we conclude that there exists no
equilibrium in this case.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (iii)
Finally, we are concerned with the case where n ≥ 4.
Proof. First, it follows from Lemma 2.4 that (1.5) and (1.6) is a sufficient condition
for equilibrium.
Next, we show that (1.5)–(1.6) is a necessary condition for equilibrium. There-
fore, we prove that if (1.5)–(1.6) do not hold, then x is not equilibrium. Observing
Proposition 2.2, we do not have to treat with the case where x1 = 0 or xn = 1 or
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more than 2 vendors occupy a location. From this reason, we assume that |I0| > 0.
We prove the following cases.
(i) Condition (1.5) does not hold.
(a) |I1| 6= 0 (resp. |In−1| 6= 0).
(b) |I1| = |In−1| = 0 and |I0| : |I2| 6= 1 : 2 (resp. |I1| = |In−1| = 0 and
|In−2| : |In| 6= 2 : 1).
(c) |I1| = |In−1| = 0 and |I0| : |I2| = 1 : 2 and |In−2| : |In| = 2 : 1 and
|I0| 6= |In|.
(ii) Condition (1.5) holds and condition (1.6) does not hold.
(a) Condition (1.5) holds and |Ij | > 2|I0|.
(b) Condition (1.5) holds and |Ij | ≤ 2|I0| and 2|I0| > |Ik|+ |Ik+1|.
Dividing this proof into the above cases, we prove our main theorem.
(i) (a) |I1| 6= 0 (resp. |In−1| 6= 0)
From (2.3) and x1 < x2 (resp. xn−1 < xn), x is not equilibrium.
(b) |I1| = |In−1| = 0 and |I0| : |I2| 6= 1 : 2 (resp. |I1| = |In−1| = 0 and
|In−2| : |In| 6= 2 : 1)
(1) |I0| : |I2| = |I0| : (2|I0|+ δ) (δ > 0)
We notice that f1(x) =
1
2
{
|I0|+
1
2
(2|I0|+ δ)
}
= |I0| +
1
4
δ.
Setting x′1 ∈ (x2, x3), we have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) =
1
2
(2|I0|+ δ) = |I0|+
1
2
δ > |I0|+
1
4
δ = f1(x).
(2) |I0| : |I2| = |I0| : (2|I0| − δ) (δ > 0)
We notice that f1(x) =
1
2
{
|I0|+
1
2
(2|I0| − δ)
}
= |I0| −
1
4
δ.
Setting x′1 = |I0| −
1
4
δ, we have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) = |[0, x
′
1]|+
1
2
|[x′1, x2]| > |[0, x
′
1]|
= |I0| −
1
4
δ = f1(x).
From the symmetry of (1)–(2), we can similarly show in the case
where |In−2| : |In| 6= 2 : 1. Thus, x is not equilibrium in the case of
(b).
(c) |I1| = |In−1| = 0 and |I0| : |I2| = 1 : 2 and |In−2| : |In| = 2 : 1 and
|I0| 6= |In|
(1) |I0| < |In|
We notice that f1(x) =
1
2
(
|I0|+
1
2
· 2|I0|
)
= |I0|. Setting
x′1 = 1− |I0|, we have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) =
1
2
|[xn, x
′
1]|+ |[x
′
1, 1]| > |[x
′
1, 1]| = |I0| = f1(x).
(2) |I0| > |In|
From the symmetry, we can similarly show that there exists x′n
such that fn(x1, · · · , xn−1, x
′
n) > fn(x).
From (1)–(2), x is not equilibrium in the case of (c).
(ii) Condition (1.5) holds and condition (1.6) does not hold.
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(a) (1.5) holds and |Ij | > 2|I0|
We notice that f1(x) =
1
2
(
|I0|+
1
2
· 2|I0|
)
= |I0|. Setting x
′
1 ∈
(xj , xj+1), we have
f1(x
′
1, x2, · · · , xn) =
1
2
|Ij | >
1
2
· 2|I0| = |I0| = f1(x).
Thus, x is not equilibrium in this case.
(b) (1.5) holds and |Ij | ≤ 2|I0| and 2|I0| > |Ik|+ |Ik+1|
When k = 1, 2, n−1, n, we notice that |I1|+|I2| = 2|I0| and |I2|+|I3| ≥
2|I0|. Thus, we devote to considering 3 ≤ k ≤ n− 2. In view of (2.2),
we divide (b) into the following three parts.
(1) xk−1 6= xk and xk 6= xk+1
We notice that fk(x) =
1
2
(|Ik|+|Ik+1|) <
1
2
·2|I0| = |I0|. Setting
x′k ∈ (x2, x3), we have fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) =
1
2
·
2|I0| = |I0| > fk(x). Thus x is not equilibrium in this case.
(2) xk−1 = xk (xk−2 6= xk−1 and xk 6= xk+1)
From |Ik|+|Ik+1| < 2|I0|, we find |Ik| < 2|I0|. From |Ij | ≤ 2|I0|,
we notice that |Ik−2| ≤ 2|I0|. It follows that fk(x) =
1
4
(|Ik−2|+
|Ik|) <
1
4
(2|I0| + 2|I0|) = |I0|. Therefore, for x
′
k ∈ (x2, x3), we
have
fk(x1, · · · , xk−1, x
′
k, xk+1, · · · , xn) =
1
2
· 2|I0| = |I0| > fk(x).
This means that x is not equilibrium in this case.
(3) xk = xk+1 (xk−1 6= xk and xk+1 6= xk+2)
We can prove this case in a similar manner to (2).
From (i)–(ii), we have showed that if condition (1.5) or condition (1.6) do not
hold, then x is not equilibrium.
We can complete the proof of Theorem 1.1. 
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. We estimate the profit of each vendor, fk(x) (k = 1, 2, . . . , n).
(i) Vendor 1
We have f1(x) =
1
2
(|I0|+
1
2
· 2|I0|) = |I0|.
(ii) Vendor 2
We can similarly deduce f2(x) = |I0|.
(iii) Vendor n− 1 and n
From the symmetry with vendors 1 and 2, we have fn−1(x) = fn(x) =
|I0|.
(iv) Vendor k (3 ≤ k ≤ n− 2)
(a) xk−1 6= xk and xk 6= xk+1
We have fk(x) =
1
2
(|Ik−1|+ |Ik|) ≥
1
2
· 2|I0| = |I0|.
(b) xk−1 = xk, xk 6= xk+1 (k 6= 3)
From (1.6), we notice that xk−2 6= xk−1. On the other hand, from
|Ik−1| = 0 and (1.6), we have |Ik−2| ≤ 2|I0| and 2|I0| ≤ |Ik−2|. Thus
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we have |Ik−2| = 2|I0|. Similarly, we have |Ik| = 2|I0|. As a conse-
quence, we have fk(x) =
1
4
(|Ik−2|+ |Ik|) =
1
4
· 4|I0| = |I0|.
(c) xk−1 6= xk, xk = xk+1 (k 6= n− 2)
We can show that fk(x) = |I0| in a similar manner to (b).
Combining (i)–(iv), we obtain

f1(x) = f2(x) = fn−1(x) = fn(x) = |I0|.
fk(x) = |I0| if xk−1 = xk or xk = xk+1 (3 ≤ k ≤ n− 3).
fk(x) ≥ |I0| if xk−1 6= xk and xk 6= xk+1 (3 ≤ k ≤ n− 3).
Thus, for x satisfying (1.5) and (1.6) and any k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), we have showed that
fk(x) ≥ |I0|.

Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. Dividing the proof into three parts, we prove this lemma.
(i) fk(xk → (xl, xl+1)) ≤ fk(x) (xl < xl+1 and l 6= k − 1, k and 0 ≤ l ≤ n).
(ii) fk(xk → (xk−1, xk+1)) ≤ fk(x) (1 ≤ k ≤ n).
(iii) fk(xk → {xl}) ≤ fk(x) (1 ≤ k ≤ n and 0 ≤ l ≤ n+ 1).
Proof of (i)
(a) l 6= 0 and l 6= n
We have fk(xk → (xl, xl+1)) =
1
2
|Il| ≤
2|I0|
2
= |I0| ≤ fk(x).
(b) l = 0
We have fk(xk → (x0, x1)) < |I0| ≤ fk(x).
(c) l = n
We have fk(xk → (xn, xn+1)) < |I0| ≤ fk(x).
Proof of (ii)
(a) k 6= 1 and k 6= n
(1) If xk−1 6= xk and xk 6= xk+1, we have fk(xk → (xk−1, xk+1)) = fk(x);
(2) If xk−1 = xk (xk 6= xk+1), since |Ik| = 2|I0| from (1.6) and |Ik−1| = 0,
we have fk(xk → (xk−1, xk+1)) =
1
2
· 2|I0| = |I0| ≤ fk(x);
(3) If xk = xk+1 (xk−1 6= xk), we can deduce fk(xk → (xk−1, xk+1)) =
|I0| ≤ fk(x) in a similar manner to (2).
(b) k = 1
We have f1(x1 → (x0, x2)) < |I0| ≤ f1(x).
(c) k = n
We have fn(xn → (xn−1, xn+1)) < |I0| ≤ fn(x).
Proof of (iii)
(a) l 6= 0, 1, 2, n− 1, n, n+ 1
(1) l = k
It clearly holds that fk(xk → {xl}) = fk(x).
(2) l = k−1, k+1 and there exists another vendor at xk except for vendor
k, or l 6= k − 1, k, k + 1
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We deduce from (1.6)
1
that fk(xk → {xl}) ≤
1
4
· 4|I0| = |I0| ≤ fk(x).
(3) l = k− 1, k+ 1 and there exists no vendor at xk except for vendor k.
We deduce from (1.6)
1
that fk(xk → {xl}) ≤
1
4
(2|I0| + 2fk(x)) ≤
1
4
(2fk(x) + 2fk(x)) = fk(x).
(b) l = 0 (resp. l = n+ 1)
We have fk(xk → {x0}) =
1
2
|I0| < |I0| ≤ fk(x).
(resp. fk(xk → {xn+1}) =
1
2
|I0| < |I0| ≤ fk(x))
(c) l = 1, 2 (resp. l = n− 1, n)
(1) k = 3 (resp. k = n− 2)
We have f3(x3 → {xl}) =
1
3
(|I0|+
1
2
(|I2|+ |I3|)) ≤
1
3
(|I0|+
1
2
(2|I0|+
2|I0|)) = |I0| ≤ f3(x).
(resp. fn−2(xn−2 → {xl}) =
1
3
(|In|+
1
2
(|In−3|+ |In−2|) ≤ fn−2(x))
(2) k 6= 3 (resp. k 6= n− 2)
We have fk(xk → {xl}) ≤
1
2
(|I0|+
1
2
|I2|) =
1
2
(|I0|+
1
2
·2|I0|) = |I0| ≤
fk(x).
(resp. fk(xk → {xl}) ≤
1
2
(|I0|+
1
2
|In−2|) ≤ fk(x))
We can complete the proof of Lemma 2.4. 
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